The Ukranian War

 

As I write this (11-03-2022) the Russians have finally untangled some of their columns near Kyiv, and are getting ready to attack the city. I do not have enough information (or time to find it), to analyse in detail how it will unfold (or rather how I would do it), but I believe I can provide an educated guess as to what the following months will unveil for us in Ukraine.

I build that estimate on 35-ish years of study of military history, strategy, tactics and logistics. But also on training in the Danish Home Guard during The Cold War to lead men in the exact kind of resistance the Ukrainians are undertaking now. As well as an intensive study of Guerrilla and subversive warfare as part of my university studies.

And let me say from the start; I make mistakes. I am no teller of the future, just an educated guesser. I made two mistakes. First I believed there was only a 20- 25% risk of war with Rasputitsa coming up- I thought the Russians would wait till summer and nap the wheat harvest at the same time, and I had believed the Russian military had been reformed and made more effective after the lacklustre performance in 2008. Apparently they had not. And like us in the West, they trained in Battalion Combat Teams, not the brigade or division scale necessary for this kind of combat. Add to this widespread corruption in the military and a fear of reporting bad news, and we see a situation where things stop working that should work and a performance so utterly terrible that it gives me flashbacks to The Winter War. Hence my prediction on the first day that the Ukrainians would resist strongly for a few days before taking to the cities to neutralise the Russian material superiority (like the Red Army did at Stalingrad) and make taking them very costly while waging a Guerrilla on Russian supply lines was wrong. I was and is right that the Ukrainians will never surrender (maybe a nuke might cow them, but I suspect not). The Ukrainians are giving ground only slowly and the poor sods Putin has deployed seem to have no idea what they are doing (they have not, for they have not practised it) and they pay a horrible price for their dictator’s wish for Lebensraum. Muddy conditions and few main roads have not helped either (though I thought the Russians would know Rasputitsa better than most). So they only control the few clogged main roads and have been bound to these. They have thus been easy targets for Ukrainian drones and ambushes by light infantry with various handheld AT weapons, notable the very effective Javelin System that hits the tank from above where it has the thinnest armour, but also many others. This has taken a heavy toll on the Russians and will continue to be a problem as long as they control only the main roads.

However, it seems the Russians are getting ready for a first serious assault on Kyiv.

It will fail! Kyiv is well fortified and we saw the first probe on its suburbs get ambushed by artillery and tanks, while driving too close together like untrained recruits. But more serious probes and then assaults will come if the Russians can gather infantry for them. And preparatory barrages that will inflict damage on Ukrainian defences, but mostly on civilians. And as they push the front close enough to Kyiv and get enough tubes and grenades moved forwards, the shelling of Kyiv will begin- probably coordinated with an attempt to isolate and encircle the city.

To be cont.

Yea well... I work too much, so it's been a whiiiile...

But today 31-03-2022 the Russian offensive has very certainly culminated without reaching anything resembling its original goals, and limited Ukranian counterattacks started on the exhausted and depleted Russians. Around Kyiv, near Kherson, and today in the Huliaipole District the Ukrainians are counterattacking, while the Russians are regrouping and reinforcing, but also digging in. Officially the Russians now only want limited goals in the Donbas Oblast- especially taking Mariupol, but despite that statement (an admission of failure) they are sending reinforcements to the area north of Irpin. In the coming week or so, it is imperative for the Ukrainians to keep up the pressure. They need to retake as much as possible, and if they in any way can, they should surround Russian forces in "Kessels", to denude the next Russian offensive of trained/experienced troops. With the ground drying and the Russians soon no longer limited to road travel, they have a limited window of opportunity. Meanwhile the Russians will try to regroup and dig in, while taking Mariupol. The fighting there is desperate and intense, with high losses to the Marines and elite Motorised Rifle Infantry fighting there, and though in theory they could be employed as offensive force towards Odessa if Mariupol had fallen a week ago. They are likely now too exhausted and depleted, and the "Tick Tock Brigade" of Kadyrovtsy (Chechens under Kadyrov) seems of little actual fighting value. 

Istitute for the Study of War writes of the forces NW of Kyiv; "Russia continued to withdraw elements of the 35th and 36th Combined Arms Armies and 76 Air Assault Division from their positions northwest of Kyiv into Belarus for refit and likely further redeployment to eastern Ukraine. However, these units are likely heavily damaged and demoralized. Feeding damaged Eastern Military District units directly into operations in eastern Ukraine—predominantly conducted by the Southern Military District—will likely prove ineffective and additionally introduce further command-and-control challenges for the Russian military."
To which I will add that the lack of a centralised command of the war will very much amplify this.

The Ukrainians are in much the same position as France in late 1914, where Germans had occupied important parts of the country and its industry, and thus needed to be kicked out fast, but was not- the fighting grinding to the bloody stalemate of The Western Front. Consequently, the Ukrainians need to be fast, before the Russians dig in, and in order to relieve Mariupol before it falls. They have to gamble some of their limited reserves and take the higher loss rates from attacking. The Russians must not be allowed to dig in and reinforce, and the Ukrainians have the advantage of interior communication and supply lines here- like Frederick the Great in the Seven Years War, though Russian air superiority will complicate things. The Russians meanwhile, will be claiming to have limited goals, but restart the attack as soon as they can. And with the high loss rates of their combat infantry, it will be by a mixture of survivors, Rosgvardiya, Kadyrovtsy, Wagner Group and militia from the rebel areas of Ukraine; supported by a lot of artillery, and there will be high loss rates on both sides. 

The Ukrainians will very likely defeat that effort as well, seeing as attacking with combined arms is an art the Russians seem to have forgotten (my soul hurts from the ineptitude they have shown, even though it is a good thing- my 1989 Danish Home Guard squad had more skill and tactical acumen even though we were "Weekend Warriors" only). However a pure infantry attack is no less difficult; requiring traning and coordination to perform the "sturmtruppen" and flanking tactics necessary. My estimation is that we will see larger scale attacks like that of Wagner Group on the US forces in Syria at The Battle of Khasham, where the "elite" mercenary group launched their Syrian allies with support from themselves and tanks in a frontal assault on a position defended by American SF supported by US air power and artillery. 

When that bloodbath ends, the front will probably freeze as will the conflict. 1915- 1917 on The Western Front and The Korean War from 1951 and forwards, as well as the Iran - Iraq War provide models of what I expect to see. The task of the Ukrainians will be to find a way to break the deadlock and kick the Russians out, for their population and economy are not as large as Russia's and they can ill afford a war of attrition.

And that is the problem; Russia's economy is currently reeling, and will get worse for a while, but at some point they will realign it along India- Chinese lines and start to rebuild it, but with growing Chinese influence, Russia that risks becoming a Chinese puppet or vassal, and Ukraine will suffer like France did in The Great War; a war of attrition is never desirable for the smaller country, and they will need a lot of western aid. 

Alternatively, the Ukrainians may roll up some or all of the weakened Russian armies, but what response will that elicit for a dictator who has gambled everything on a fast and glorious takeover of the Ukraine? Tactical nukes on cities and supply points cannot be ruled out, whatever outcry it may create globally. It is unlikely that the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal will come in play, for no single person can activate that, and it will up the game to a level where the west might have to respond in kind- and nobody is interested in a nuclear exchange, nobody! Also, if the Russian strategic arsenal is in the same abysmal state the other armed forces are, they may be very reluctant to reveal that.

04-04 Interestingly, the Russians seem to have given up entirely in the north. That surprised me as much as their general incompetence. I can only ascribe it to Ukrainian pressure and rolling up the front. There will no doubt be another wave in the southeast as described above, and with the consequenses I predict. 

F-35, Tigers and Yom Kippur

This was originally written for and published in the Danish magazine; "Krigeren" in 2016, but despite my efforts no English-language equivalent wanted to publish this translated version.

With even USAF admitting the failure of the F-35 now in this article; I choose to now publish it below:

If historical research is to be justified, we as historians must point out current parallels to history in order for decisionmakers and populations to make informed choices. As I see it, this is very much the case right now.

Let us start at the history I believe we need to pay attention to and learn from.

During WW II, the Germans produced 46937 tanks (and Stugs, etc), 1347 were the fearsome Tigers and 5500 Panthers (also a very good tank). The USSR produced 106104 and the Americans 102253. The Soviet and American factories were set up for industrial mass-production and thus of lower craftsmanship and slightly lower quality (but quantity has a quality of its own), while the Germans set up theirs as craft mass production of high quality. In the USSR and USA, politicians decided the specifications for their tanks, while in Germany it was the Wehrmacht (who would naturally want the highest possible quality). Hence, the Tiger was constantly subject to new demands and specifications and on average, every sixth Tiger was changed in some way from the former model- every sixth! Moreover, its production demanded a highly trained and specialized work force; “hand crafted by the Dwarven smiths in the Mines of Moria”, Jonathan Parshall jokingly calls it, but he is not far off.

Consequently, a Sherman cost $ 33500 and 10000 man-hours to build, while a T-34 took 35- 50000 man-hours (at an unknown price because of the Soviet plan economy). In contrast, a Tiger cost $320000 and 300000 man-hours to build. And though it was said that a Tiger equalled five Shermans/T-34s and a Panther three, that would not suffice at ten times the price and time to build. The German soldiers were literally correct in their complaints about the never-ceasing flood of enemies.

So, the Germans produced a very technologically advanced high quality product, but with extreme demands and very low output. And it was not limited to the Tiger, though the Panther was cheaper at $ 45-50000, it and the Pz IV suffered the same problems of bottlenecks and problems in production, at lower degrees respectively. Further, the advanced designs of both Tiger and Panther was plagued by childhood diseases and were always prone to breakdowns.

 

Sixth of October 1972 Egyptian and Syrian units, supported by other Arab nations and the USSR, attacked and advanced into the US-supported Israel in an effort to retake lost land and gain honorary redress from their defeats of the past. In the following 20 days of high-intensity warfare both sides suffered heavy losses. The Israeli air force included, between 102 and 128 aircraft depending on source. These losses of aircraft could only be replaced and defeat averted by American aid. An America whose Military-Industrial Complex turned out not to be able to build new aircraft at the rate they were lost. I.E. a superpower’s arms industry could not replace the losses in a relatively small high-intensity war. Let us spell it out again; American arms industry during The Cold War (where they were geared for WW3), could not replace the losses in a small and brief regional war with high losses. Largely because American aircraft were advanced technological wonders.

 

Now, even from the design phase and before the delays and additional funding the F-35 JSF was the most expensive weapons system ever. It is expected to relieve F-16, A-10, F-18 and AVB-8, and thus function as both fighter and dedicated ”Ground Attack Plane”, just as it is expected to be able to land vertically and take off from carriers. Without evaluating whether it can actually live up to all those variable demands (though many experts conclude it cannot), one must objectively observe that it is a very broad range of demands. And one that it must hence require a very advanced and very expensive weapons system to fulfill. A weapons system that is very difficult to design and make work, and one that is very difficult to produce. Further, one that demands a specialized workforce (which Lockheed-Martin emphasizes as positive on their homepage). All this has resulted in a seven years’ delay until now (running on eight) and an extreme increase in cost. The F-35 is thus very complicated and extremely expensive (while the West has not yet recovered from the Financial Crisis). The resemblance to the Tiger is striking, and the production rate of one aircraft a day, according to defencenews.com, is not impressive when considering the lessons of Yom Kippur.

 

What this means in case of a high-intensity conflict, is that the USA and NATO is in a similar situation to the Germans in 1943; we may be able to produce a technological wonder-weapon (if Lockheed-Martin’s sales pitch is to believe), but we cannot do so fast and cheaply enough. And like the Israelis in 1972, we will run out of aircraft- and we have no “larger brother” to assist us, we (NATO) are the larger brother and the responsibility is ours. We risk running out of aircraft; right now, with the demand being very high as many NATO-countries look to replace their aging air fleets, only one F-35 a day. How is this to keep up with loss rates in a high intensity war, where NATO is likely to lose more than one aircraft a day (in fact if history is a model to learn by, accidents and technical problems will lose us more than one a day). So production simply cannot keep up with demand on this advanced weapons system, just like Germany’s supply of Tigers could not keep up with the demand for them). Do we have a plan for covering these losses?

 

In conclusion, with the price, production rates and technical problems of the F-35, just like Germany with the Tiger, we cannot produce enough of them fast enough to even replace losses in case of a high-intensity war- especially with a major power. And even if we believe Lockheed-Martin’s sales pitch about its wonderful properties, this is still the case. We, the populations and voters in NATO, need our politicians to explain to us, how they will solve that problem.

  

Ekstra info til nysgerrige og interesserede studerende

Forelæsninger, podcasts og dokumentarer

• ·        John Merriman; European Civilisation, forelæsningsrække fra Yale om emnet på Youtube med en af de fremmeste eksperter.
• ·        John Merriman; France since 1871, forelæsningsrække fra Yale om dette på Youtube med en af de fremmeste eksperter på området.
• ·        Donald Kagan; Ancient Greece, forelæsningsrække fra Yale om det antikke Grækenland – igen af en af de fremmeste eksperter på området.
• ·        Freedman; The Early Middle Ages, endnu en forelæsningsrække fra Yale med en af deres fremragende historikere, der bare generelt er blandt verdens bedste. Denne om tidlig europæisk middelalder.
• ·        The History of Rome, podcast by Mike Duncan
• Første Verdenskrig, dokumentar fra BBC 2003
• The Cold War fra CNN, den er fin til forståelse og mere viden end jeg har tid til at give jer i timerne.
• The War of the World med Niall Fergusson - et anderledes perspektiv på det 20. århundrede 
• Historien om Danmark, med forbehold for den ikke helt objektive behandling af Besættelse og Modstand, er også fin.
• Meet The Romans med Mary Beard fokuserer på de almindelige romeres liv i stedet for på politikere, krige og magtpolitik, som jeg ellers kan have en tendens til. Der ligger også flere dokumentarer om Pompeji med hende på Youtube og de er alle værd at se.
• Murder in Rome er en dramadokumentar om starten på Ciceros karriere. Det er selvfølgelig dramatiseret og for øvrigt baseret på hans egen fremstilling af retssagen, men giver stadig et godt billede af Senrepublikkens Rom og en anden vej af Cursus Honorum and som feltherre.
• Jareed Diamonds "Guns, Germs and Steel om de faktorer, der muliggjorde Europas herredømme.

Bøger, primært skønlitterære

• ·        Den romerske familie
• ·        Jordens Søjler
• ·         

Tv-serier – Drama og dramadokumentar

• ·        HBO – Rome
• ·        HBO – Band of Brothers
• ·        HBO – The Pacific
• ·        PBS – Godfathers of the Renaissance; The Medici. PBS’ hjemmeside har også en fin interaktiv oversigt over emnet.
• ·        Historien om Danmark

Film (drama)

• ·        Stalingrad (tysk 1993)
• ·        One Bridge too far
• ·        Das Boot

The Paris Attacks and how Guerre Révolutionnaire can help us understand- and counter- terror.

Paris 13-11-2015


Despite the horror of the terror attack it is not the last of such to occur, I believe that we will see a similar development globally. And, it is a perfectly logical and legitimate attack in the mind of the guerilla fighter.



I will outline his methods below.
Let me first quote the father of modern guerilla; Mao Tse-Tsung, "It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation".[1]
When there is some sort of (perceived) repression, the ground is ripe for a reaction. Sometimes and somewhere that reaction will be militant.
This will often happen if the repressor is unwilling to find a political solution and give concessions or is perceived to be so.
The natural resort of the repressed will then be to employ guerilla to liberate themselves. The course of action thereafter can be divided into phases.


Mao uses the following:


1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.
Practically, Ho Chi Min and Giap organized this into five phases:


1. Propagandists and agitators start a subterranean work in the population. They are attentive to and receptive of dissatisfaction with the legal authorities (those imposed by the reigning system, it may be the occupation authorities as well but we will refer to them as legal authorities hereafter) and the pervading social conditions.
Their primary task is recognisance and they are thus careful not to call attention to themselves by revolutionary rhetoric. Instead, they can start discussion groups and clubs, for example, where their ideas can be debated and discussed. In the current Islamic vs The West conflict, Mosques, Islamic schools and- most of all- social media.


2. When these agitators has ensured local support they start to organise activists in groups according to age, profession or interests, it does not matter as long as they are organised. These groups have the task of surveying each-other and the individuals in them, in the political work and are themselves surveyed by committees. The goal of this organisation is to enmesh the individual tightly in a network of parallel hierarchies. Or rather new hierarchies organised and depending on the rebels/partisans/freedom fighters/resistance. One hierarchy is territorial; starting with the family, city block, farm etc. and is subject to various levels of a hierarchy topped by the rebels' provincial government. Another hierarchy is based on the above organisations, it incorporates male and female youth groups, mother's groups, peasant organisations, workers' organisation and any conceivable organisation the rebels can think of organising their subjects in. The imperative is that no one escapes being spun into the new parallel hierarchies where the territorial one "crosses" an organisational one surveying it that it itself surveys. To engage and organise the individual politically and generally and to ensure that there is always an eye kept on it in every aspect of its life. In the current global conflict, this differs slightly as this is a religious conflict while the Communist insurrections of the anti-colonial area were atheists. But there is a parallel to the religious hierarchy governing the life of the “Faithful”, and the various political organisations based on Sharia they are part of. But also family and clan organisation and loyalties is very important here, and these are based on a code of (dis)honour and upheld by slander and snitching. No one in the Middle- East is free of it, and no Moslem immigrant in a Danish or French ghetto is either- though some ignore it. It, with the religious codex and Sharia, is a very strong and successful social control.
This is where organised resistance to the legal authorities starts spreading, a process referred to by the French as "pourrissement" (rot/rotting); as a subterranean network of spies and agitators starts spreading and channel dissatisfied elements into the movement while they assert pressure- economical and physical pressure (by violence)- on the authorities' supporters and neutral persons to spread terror. Those pressured will consequently be frightened from further supporting the authorities. Those authorities that will often only discover the ripples on the surface of the water created by the dissidents at this stage (the guerrilla thrive, struggle and live in the population like the fish does in the sea as aptly described by Mao "The people are the sea and the guerrilla fighter the fish"). The ripples being the various signs of discontent and lacking support of the authorities.
This, then, suddenly places the authorities in a struggle to maintain authority and governing as the rebel network, organisation and hierarchy will have supplanted legal rule in many places and compete with them in many others. Further, the rebels are now able to escalate the number of agitators, saboteurs and terrorists from their safe bases; i.e., the havens of safety where their rule has totally supplanted the legal one. In the Islamist struggle versus the West they are aplenty in their so-called Kalifate, Sahel, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, there are also neighbourhoods in European cities not under government control, and they work the same. Hence, terrorist cells are planted or organised in local Moslem population of the West.


3. Armed gangs are raised for smaller actions such as ambushes on government patrols and raids on isolated police posts. The agitation, sabotage and terror started in the last phase is stepped up in intensity and the latter proves itself the most powerful tool in the rebels’ arsenal. Terror can be both indiscriminate and selective; a bomb in a cafe with supporters of both sides will create an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety (which is ripe ground for agitation and recruitment- and polarises the situation as neutrals seek the extremes on both sides). And it challenges the authorities' ability to govern and protect the population- and showcasing that inability to do so; while assassination of the authorities local representatives and selected supporters (or perceived such) will have the same effect with the added benefit that it will make people hesitate to support authorities or accept working for them. Attacks on symbols of the enemy and his ideology is important in this phase as well; be it the American Embassy in Saigon, ancient monuments in Palmyra, World Trade Centre or a night club. In the current struggle, terrorist cells start attacking such targets in the West. These can be the organised sort like Madrid, London, Mumbai, Charlie Hebdo or 13-11, or encouraging “lone wolfs”/madmen to strike alone.


4. Terrorism and guerrilla force the legal authorities to wholly give up on certain areas where the rebels can subsequently create their own provisional governments and further step up the work to mobilise the population and achieve international recognition. Powers of friendly disposition towards the rebels can be in the van of such recognition and the campaign to recognise them; and can now supply them with arms etc. and a regular rebel army can now be created. In the current struggle obviously, “the Kalifate” is such an area, but areas of Nigeria, Pakistan, Sahel, Yemen, Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan are also outside of government control locally. And in a broader context extremist/conservative Islamic states also exists. The Gulf States and Iran just for starters. Some of whom play the role as our allies while financing Jihadist movements.


5. The last phase of the rebellion is a general, all-out offensive against the weakened authorities who are now ready for the death-knell. In the current struggle, when enough territory is united under Islamist rule, the Jihad to conquer “Dar al-Harab/Dar al-Garan” (House of War and House of the West respectively) and “Dar al-Kufr” (House of the Infidel), will be launched to give the death-knell to the West (and others, China, India and Russia are not friendly to Islam), and unite the world under one faith.


The rebel movement will be freely able to switch back and forth between the various phases and the individual struggle is too complicated and sophisticated to be covered by such a generalised model. However, it can provide a framework for the individual struggle to be studied within.


It is of great importance to recognise some aspects of guerrilla.
There is no difference between soldier and civilian in such a struggle. To differentiate would weaken the movement by taking away assets and resources from it, Mao says "Considering the revolutionary war as a whole, the operations of the people's guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a man's right arm and left arm, and if we had only the main forces of the Red Army without the people's guerrillas, we would be like a warrior with only one arm".[2] The struggle is also not about territory as in classical warfare but rather concerns the mind of the people. Even the regular forces of the movement must hence have a fourfold task to accomplish; to serve as political and military education (and conditioning) for the soldier and administrator, to create and spread propaganda in the population, to serve as a tool for exerting pressure on the opposition and, lastly; as a tool for warfare. Concurrently, tasks usually undertaken by the military; intelligence gathering and logistics, is performed by the civilian sector. However, the border between soldier and civilian is permeable; a teenager can throw stones at soldiers and a young mother is ideal for smuggling explosives. All while this is going on a struggle for support in the repressor's population as well as internationally is undertaken in order to mobilise support and weaken the backing of his struggle. Generally the repressor/legal authority will be weakened to such an extent before the final blow in phase 5 that the outcome of that is already given. In the current struggle the European left follow an ideology that makes them sympathetic to the plight of a Moslem world dominated by the former colonial overlords, and formerly used in the struggle of the Cold War. While the same left is also hostile to International Activism, capitalism, Realist international politics, government politics in their homelands and the US. Meanwhile the horrors of the Nazis and colonialism, and the decolonisation struggles, has made Europe reluctant to embark on aggressive wars as they would in the colonial era. Further, in rich, content states with high-tech weaponry; such as in the West, no one is willing to risk their lives unless absolutely necessary.

So as you see (if you are still reading), terror is a perfectly legitimate tool of the guerrilla as it holds a powerful sway over the mind of the population that are fought over. Terror is one of the only weapons available to the weak and oppressed to fight off the strong aggressor. Worse still; the only military solution to counter a guerrilla campaign is an even more bloody countercampaign. To scourge the countryside of all possible guerrilla fighters, round them up and kill or imprison them. Which is not really an option for a civilised country, as it will cost civilian lives. The only other solution is political or political-military and involves negotiations and concessions; i.e. giving the insurgent, what he wants. In this case the Islamists- I am actually uncertain what they want, but I am rather certain it is not something pleasant for anyone involved except the Mullahs/Imams/Ayatollahs…






So how does the model/analysis of Guerrilla Mao, Ho and Giap gives us work on the situation at hand? As stated and described above the model is useful, but I shall elaborate.


Starting with Iran’s Ayatollahs as well as Arab nationalists, there has long been a discourse against the West and “corrupt” Western lifestyle and “vices” in the Middle East. Dissent has spread- even into our own immigrant communities (who in many cases also feel estranged and discriminated against in the greater society). Against global Western military, economic, cultural and political dominance. Not to mention our colonialist pasts. There is also a growing inequality in the world, which fans the flames. And it does not help that we support autocrats in the Middle-East, nor did the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the intervention in Libya or our support for Israel and Israeli settlement policy. We have various reasons for all this, but it does not help; and in some cases, we have to admit in our hearts that they are right in their criticism of us- in some case, but not most.


The agitation has spread- currently helped by social media (a two-edged sword, for the youngsters with Western ideas and sympathies in the Jasmin Revolutions, used them as well)- and both armed resistance in the form of terror, and insurgent bases has popped up. We see their allies support them, and they spread terror amongst both our supporters in the Middle East, doubters and in our own population, while their sympathisers in the West spread dissent by claiming it is our own fault.


Hence we are probably in a sort of Phase Three, but it is really hard to say, and the resistance is not organised in a single, focused organisation. We have Taleban, Al Qaida, DAESH, Iran, and the Gulf States all vying for leadership of the resistance and regional hegemony in- often vicious- infighting.













What can we do about it?

My proposal(s) will be another day. Today was long enough already. But it will be built on Guerre Révolutionnaire. But in brief:


Drones are convenient for lazy buggers not wishing to risk lives as war is the easy solution to dumb chickenhawks- but the REAL solution to take out terrorists is the following counter; intelligence is the key to counter terrorism, all means must be employed and key enemy figures be taken out by small teams of special forces or agents in pinprick operations, while countering their discourse with our own and giving real concessions by enforcing less dicatorial regimes in their homelands and actually trading with them to create jobs. JWB chose something else. Obama choose something else again. Both wrong.

















[1] Tse-tung, M, 1937 Kap. 1


[2] Tse-Tung, 1938, s. 238

The Ukrainian Crisis

Ukraine: If Russia keeps to the Crimean, Ukraine will most likely accept the fait accompli, and see what concessions they can get in exchange. However, as Putin dreams of rebuilding the Russian-Soviet empire and the Russians never understood Ukraine’s wish for independence, they may go for Kharkov and Donetsk as well. If this happens it will be a de facto declaration of war and the Ukrainians will be forced to defend themselves; not that they stand a chance in the long run, but they can make the Russians pay a larger price in blood than the latter wish for. How the West will react to this is uncertain, but there will not be war between NATO and Russia, there is too much to lose should the situation escalate. And, the West will probably have to admit that- like the USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis- they have stepped too far into the competitor’s back yard. For the Ukraine is very definitely in Russia’s back yard, and Putin made that clear already in 2008. All powers strive to be regional hegemons so as to maintain security; and Putin does not want the armies of traditional enemies such as the US, France, Poland and Germany with bases and free access to the Ukraine. In other words, there is not far for the panzers to roll from Kiev to Moscow. History very- very much determines security policies in great powers who pursue the Realist way. More likely, the West will accept Russian dominance of the Ukraine, even a limited war to get the eastern parts “heims in Reich”, but likely not a total occupation of the country. Something that is unlikely in any case, whereas a limited operation seems quite probable. Russia can live with a boycut in exchange for maintaining hegemony and demonstrating its willingness to back its friends. And a boycut will hurt the West as well, as gas and oil prices will soar. Now, some people say that the Cold War is flaring up again, this is not true. What we see now, is merely the manifestation of international politics of great powers; as was the Cold War, though the ideology of the two combatants supposedly made this special, they were also a means to an end. The situation is changed in that there are more powers playing now, and ideology does not matter as much (except nationalism in Russia and the Ukraine), but we are merely seeing manifestations of great power international politics, just as we see it in N. Korea and the East China Sea. And it will not very likely lead to WWIII.

Kamptropper og Baglandskrigere

Efter at have læst følgende kronik af Oberst Lars R. Møller http://www.b.dk/kronikker/befinder-auditoeren-sig-i-det-ydre-rum og tænkt over udviklingen de sidste par år er målet fuldt og jeg må appellere til Forsvarsministeren. I sin tid, i min tid som gruppefører i en patrulje-/udrykkegruppe i HJV fik jeg en liste med 9 forventninger fra underordnede til deres leder. De passede fint til mine tanker, så jeg elaborerede selv, og gemte listen. Punkterne er som følger; -Han kan sit job og er altså kompetent. -Han stiller højere krav til sig selv end sine folk. -Han er interesseret i sine folk og kerer sig om dem. -Han viser tillid til sine folk. -Han vil samarbejde med sine folk. -Han kan og vil kommunikere med sine folk. -Han træffer klare og retfærdige afgørelser. -Han støtter om sine folk. -Han er til at stole på. -Han følger selv de regler han kræver efterlevet. En sådan leder vil underordnede følge til verdens ende eller helvedes port; om det er tømrermesteren, der gør forrest gennem sneen for at komme til at bygge om vinteren, officeren, der siger "Følg mig!" og leder angrebet, eller læreren, der altid er velforberedt, vidende og hjælpsom. De underordnede vil yde alt de kan for en sådan leder og gå længere end de egentlig tror de kan. I krig er det nødvendigt at hver enkelt yder sit yderste, og de ledere vi sender til Afghanistan og andre krigszoner må alle leve op til ovennævnte krav. Det er det de har lært i deres uddannelse og det er efter disse retningslinjer de leder deres menige, og får dem til at yde deres bedste mens de deler strabadser, lidelser, sorg og angst. Men selv i situationer, hvor andre ville fryse i angst, stikke af eller reagere instinktivt, kræver systemet og de menige de har ansvaret for, at vores unge officerer i felten reagerer rigtigt ud fra deres træning og under hensyntagen til hæmmende regler. Disse unge mænd har et enormt ansvar, og fortjener al tak og hæder. Og de bør kunne forvente af deres egen ledelse i forsvarets top og Forsvarsministeriet, at disse lever op til de ti punkter ovenfor. Og de vil, som deres egne menige, gå til verdens ende for ledere af den type- det er derfor Oberst Lars R. Møller er så populær blandt felttropperne. Det ligger i virkeligheden i disse unge opofrende mænd at de savner en sådan ledelse; et fyrtårn til at vejlede dem i usikkert farvand. Men det får de ikke! Politikerne, især på venstrefløjen, har- selv hvis de ikke er fjendtligt indstillede overfor Forsvaret- fuldstændig urealistiske forestillinger om krigsførelse og realiteterne i krig. Ikke mindst i en guerilla. Disse forestillinger har ført til urealistiske forventninger og regler, der hæmmer indsatsen og giver fjenden frie hænder. De samme urealistiske forventninger præger desværre også Forsvarets top, og i stedet for ledelse efter de principper de unge officerer selv leder efter, bliver de mødt af skrivebordskrigeres og politikeres urealistiske krav. Og de bliver mødt med mistro, disinteresse, mangel på samarbejde og kommunikation, mangel på støtte, urealistiske krav og uretfærdige anklager. Om de føler de ikke kan stole på Forsvarets ledelse og deres politikere, kan jeg ikke sige; men det ville være en naturlig reaktion på den seneste tids udvikling, hvor nedskæringer rammer kamptropperne fremfor bureaukrati og logistikerne, der begge har udviklet sig til autopoietiske systemer, med alt hvad det indebærer. Kamptropperne bliver igen og igen sendt til Afghanistan, mens baglandskrigerne er sikre og sikret job. Og her er vi slet ikke kommet ind på inkompetencen bag de fejlslagne projekter, som kamptropperne igen betaler prisen for med nedskæringer. Dette er naturligvis uholdbart. Det genererer mistillid og fremmedgørelse mellem kamptropper og ledelse såvel som politikere. Det kommer selvfølgelig ikke så langt ud i Danmark som i Frankrig 1946- 1962. Men det vil være en naturlig udvikling, hvis både unge officerer og menige i højere og højere grad værger sig ved, at melde sig til internationale aktioner, hvor de bliver mødt med utaknemmelighed og anklager i stedet for den hæder og taknemmelighed de rettelig fortjener. De skarpeste hjerner vil med denne udvikling vælge andre karriereveje, og Danmark mister dermed det vi altid har anset for at være vores vigtigste fordel; at vi har selvstændigt tænkende og initiativrige soldater, hvis vigtigste våben ikke er deres automatgevær, men deres hjerne. Selvfølgelig skal de danske soldater overholde krigens regler, og de er alle trænet i dette. Men der er grænser for reglerne, og der er grænser for hvor meget mistillid og anklager vi kan møde dem med inden de ikke længere gør deres yderste. Derfor vil jeg rette denne appel til forsvarsministeren, hvis far forstod det, tænk over måden Forsvaret ledes på, tænk over hvilket signal der sendes til Forsvarets top om den linje de skal følge og hvilket signal der sendes til drengene, der hver dag risikerer livet i Helmand. Måske næste gang far er i Danmark, i skal tage en snak, han forstod det.

En bedre skriftlig opgave

Husk, alle kan lire en masse fakta af, hvis man mestrer faget udvælger man det vigtige og præsenterer det kort og præcist!

1.0 Disposition
1.0 Disposition

2.0 Indledning

3.0 Problemformulering

4.0 Teoretisk Baggrund

5.0 Teoretisk gennemgang af en opgaves opbygning
5.1 Disposition
5.2 Indledningen
5.3 Opgaveformuleringen
5.4 Teoretisk Baggrund
5.5 Forskningsgennemgang
5.6 "Behandling" (Redegørelse/Analyse)
5.7 Konklusionen, Opsummering & Afslutning
5.8 Litteraturliste

6.0 HF-Opgave i praksis
6.1 Den udleverede opgaveformulering vs. den anvendte
6.2 Opgaven
6.3 Konklusionen, Opsummering & Afslutning
6.4 Litteraturliste


7.0 Konklusionen, Opsummering & Afslutning

8.0 Litteraturliste

9.0 Afsluttende bemærkninger- vigtige!



2.0 Indledning
Idéen med denne blog er, at hjælpe elever i de store klasser, gymnasiet/HF og forhåbentlig også de videregående uddannelsers grundforløb til at skrive bedre opgaver. Det er nemlig min oplevelse og mit indtryk, at der ikke i fornøden grad undervises i dette. Selv lærte jeg det først mens jeg skrev speciale og deltog i et specialeseminar med Agnes S. Arnórsóttir og Per Ingesman, og de første år på universitetet var som resultat deraf betydeligt sværere end de burde have været. Dette håber jeg at afhjælpe for andre. Dog kræver min model til opgaveskrivning, at man har styr på sit stof. Har man ikke det, skal man få det først og så vende tilbage. Bibliotekernes guide til informationssøgning har en udmærket, men mere overfladisk gennemgang, der inkluderer også emnevalg og informationssøgning her. Dette inkluderer jeg i første omgang ikke, men går i stedet mere i dybden med selve opgavens opbygning.







Forfatteren.
Undertegnede er Cand Mag i historie og statskundskab fra Aarhus Universitet, oprindeligt tømrer og i perioden August 2011 til Februar 2012 tilknyttet Center-10 "Aarhus High School" som støttelærer i 20/20 Erhvervslinjen. Desuden har jeg ydet lektie-/opgavehjælp til gymnasie-/HF elever.




3.0 Opgaveformulering
På min lidt specielle vej gennem uddannelsessystemet, på Center-10 og når jeg yder hjælp til opgaveskrivning for gymnasie-/HF elever oplever jeg en mangel på oplysning til de studerende om hvordan man rent faktisk skriver en opgave. Ligeledes oplever jeg de udleverede problemformuleringer til skriftlige opgaver som værende mangelfulde og uden megen forbindelse til formuleringen af den opgave man faktisk forventer, at få tilbage. Når ingen har lært eleverne at omformulere disse til en praktisk opgaveformulering, vil resultatet blive derefter.
Dette agter jeg at forsøge at råde bod på, opgaverne skulle dermed gerne generelt blive bedre, men under alle omstændigheder i hvert fald lettere, at læse såvel som skrive.
Jeg vil derfor foretage en teoretisk gennemgang af en skriftlig opgave for derefter at komme med et praktisk eksempel på en opgaveformulering fra HF såvel som den opgave eleven med min hjælp fik ud af det, så læseren kan se teorien anvendt i praksis. Det skal understreges, at gennemgangen her ikke er gældende for Bachelor-opgaver, Specialer, osv. Ej heller gælder dette for essays. Dette er blot en hjælp til de kortere opgaver med færre krav til indhold og skal hjælpe læseren til en forståelse af hvordan man opbygger en skriftlig opgave eller videnskabelig artikel. For andre opgavetyper, såvel som en dybere forståelse af opgaveskrivning henvises til litteraturlisten, især Rienecker & Jørgensen.
Endvidere prøver jeg, at praktisere det jeg prædiker; man vil forhåbentlig bemærke at vejledningen her er opbygget som jeg hævder en skriftlig opgave bør være det.



4.0 Teoretisk Baggrund
Teorien bag denne blog er en blanding af Rienecker-Jørgensens idéer og egne erfaringer fra studiet.
Teorien er, at en opgave skal starte med at fremlægge sit emne og behandle det fortløbende from mod en afsluttende konklusion. Den er altså fokuseret og logisk opbygget og kan forklares med at tænke på en film eller bogs fortællemodel, der præsenterer et problem for at arbejde sig hen mod et klimaks. Klimakset er så bare i opgaven den mindre spændingsmættede konklusion. Hvorefter man med en god karakter i lommen kan vende tilbage til hverdagen.



5.0 Teoretisk gennemgang af en opgaves opbygning
Som nævnt ovenfor skal en opgave helst præsentere sit problem i starten. Eventuelt præsentere den teori man agter at bruge i behandlingen af problemet, og den hidtidige forsknings opfattelse af emnet (dette, især det sidste, skal dog kun gøres i længere opgaver, hvor der er plads). For så at gå til behandlingen af stoffet og til sidst ud fra dette konkludere svaret på problemformuleringen. Som sagt ovenfor, som en film.

5.1 Disposition
Dispositionen præsenteres først i opgaven for at give læseren et overblik over hvad han/hun skal i gang med. Man skriver en skitse-disposition først som et værktøj til selv at bevare overblikket over opgaven, men er som oftest noget af det sidste, der færdiggøres, da man ofte kommer til at se nye emner i løbet af skrivningen.

5.2 Indledningen
I Indledningen præsenterer man kort hvad man bredt vil arbejde med og hvorfor. Det er også vigtigt, at huske at fortælle hvad man ikke inkluderer og hvorfor. Dette viser at man behersker stoffet og man undgår risikoen for, at underviseren tror at man har glemt noget. Den skal være kort og præcis.

5.3 Problemformulering
Denne er umådeligt vigtig, for i den præsenterer du problemet og de spørgsmål du vil svare på, for at behandle det. Problemformuleringen er rammen for din Behandling (Redegørelse/Analyse) og det du besvarer i din konklusion. Den er derfor det fundament du bygger hele opgaven på, og har du en god problemformulering er det lettere at skrive en god opgave. Lige som det er lettere at bygge et solidt hus, hvis du har et godt fundament. Men det er ingen garanti! Identificer spørgsmålene der skal besvares og formuler dem så de kan besvares.

5.4 Teoretisk Baggrund
Til længere opgaver bør man præsentere den teori man agter at bruge, hvis nogen. Statskundskab, for eksempel, benytter altid en teori/model til forståelse af sit komplicerede emne, hvorimod Historie til tider kan nøjes med empiri.

5.5 Forskningsgennemgang
I mange tilfælde kan det til gengæld betale sig, at præsentere histiografien og/eller sine kilder, gerne ved også at forholde sig kritisk til disse kilder. Dermed viser man, at man behersker stoffet, kender sine kilder og er bevidst om hvad andre forskere har sagt. Selv i en 10-15 siders opgave kan det betale sig kort at præsentere sine hovedkilder, men i det tilfælde skal det være meget kort og uden histiografi (se eksemplet på en SSO). Som man kan se præsenterer hun kort sine kilder og forholder sig kritisk til dem.

5.6 "Behandlingen" (Redegørelse/Analyse)
Når jeg ovenfor siger "behandlingen" er det med vilje. Der er forskel på redegørelse og analyse; redegørelse fokuserer på sammenhænge, hændelsesforløb og årsager. Den er derfor mere dybdegående end et referat, men ikke i så høj grad som en analyse/vurdering, der også er diskuterende. Analysen inddrager altså flere fortolkninger, diskuterer deres validitet og tager stilling til den mest sandsynlige, mens en redegørelse ikke som sådan tager stilling.
Man skal dog være opmærksom på, at denne fortolkning af redegørelse kontra analyse ikke gør sig gældende i alle fag, og at analyse også bruges til analyse af kilder, der så inddrages i den større analyse/redegørelse.
Det vigtige er, at man hvis man ønsker en god karakter skal løfte sig ud over blot at referere andre forskere, men faktisk tage stilling til deres fortolkninger/argumenter og fremlægge den mest sandsynlige.
Man vil bemærke at "Bibliotekernes Guide til Informationssøgning" bruger en lidt anden model. Begge er anvendelige og de overlapper, min kræver dog en lidt større beherskelse af stoffet. Fordelen ved min model er, at den tillader at man kan opdele behandlingen efter delemner og dermed belyse det fra flere vinkler. Dette tillader både en bedre analyse og viser at man behersker emnet og sine kilder. BGIs derimod er at foretrække, hvis man ikke har så godt styr på stoffet. Redegørelsen tillader nemlig en præsentation på en let forståelig måde både for forfatteren og læseren inden man går til analysen og vurderingen.

5.7 Konklusionen, Opsummering & Afslutning
I konklusionen sammenfatter og vurderer du dine resultater fra Behandlingen og svarer dermed på dit/dine spørgsmål fra Problemformuleringen. Desuden kan/skal du også perspektivere i konklusionen (det er også om muligt en god ting undervejs).
Det du skal er altså at opsummere/resumere din Behandling og give en vurdering af de resultater den nåede frem til. Vurdere værdien af dem og besvare spørgsmålene fra Problemformuleringen. I en længere opgave kan det betale sig, at have resumeet til sidst i behandlingen, eller have delkonklusioner undervejs, for så at konkludere til sidst. Denne metode kan ses i mit speciale her. Til slut skal man om muligt perspektivere, altså trække tråde fremad til senere begivenheder eller andre områder. Behandler man f.eks. Første Verdenskrig kan en fin afsluttende perspektivering lyde "De specielle omstændigheder omkring Våbenstilstanden og den tyske kapitulation gjorde, at mange i baglandet ikke følte sig slået i kamp. Dette skulle få alvorlige konsekvenser senere...".
Nogle opgaver kræver endvidere et kort engelsk resume her til slut, hvor man kort præsenterer problemet, behandlingen og konklusionen.

5.7 Litteraturliste
I Litteraturlisten præsenterer du dine kilder i listeform, så din lærer kan se hvor du har dine påstande fra. Du skal derfor præsentere alle dine kilder; bøger, artikler, film, TV-programmer, internetkilder, musik, hvad som helst.
I større opgaver kan det betale sig at opdele i hovedkilder og sekundære kilder, men kun i større opgaver. Der er forskellige måder at lave en litteraturliste, spørg din lærer til råds om hvilken han/hun foretrækker. Den man anvender på Historiak Institut, Aarhus Universitet kan man se i opgaveeksemplet her og mit speciale her. Bloggens layout giver ikke et perfekt overblik, hvis du er forvirret og ønsker en Word/PDF kopi, kan jeg kontaktes per mail.



6.0 HF-opgave i praksis
Følgende skal jeg prøve at præsentere teorien anvendt i praksis. Der henvises til HF-SSOen her. Jeg ydede eleven støtte, men opgaven fik desværre kun 10 alligevel. Dette skyldtes en forskellig forståelse fra læreren og jeg. Som jeg opfattede det havde de to delspørgsmål ingen sammenhæng, og for at skabe en sammenhæng og rød tråd i opgaven, rådede jeg eleven til at skrive mest om det hun vidste mest om, nemlig Republikkens fald. Læreren fandt, at der var sammenhæng og fandt derfor delspørgsmål 2 underbelyst.

6.1 Den udleverede opgaveformulering vs. den anvendte
Som man kan se stiller den udleverede opgaveformulering ikke spørgsmål til besvarelse. Dette var (og er) op til eleven selv. Og det er jo som sagt i hvor høj grad dette lykkes, der afgør hvor god opgaven bliver. Derfor valgte forfatteren (på mit råd) at koncentrere sig om, at beskrive et delemne (i sig selv stort nok til en SSO), og i mindre grad de to andre (dette er lidt, at tage en chance, man kan blive straffet for det). Hun formulerede derfor et hovedspørgsmål, ”Bar Res Publica Romana (den romerske republik) kimen til egen undergang i sit politiske system?”, og de to delspørgsmål, "Hvordan opfattede romerne de fremmede kulturer de mødte?", samt, "I hvor høj grad virkede håndteringen af dette kulturmøde stabiliserende eller nedbrydende på romerrigets sammenhængskraft, kejserriget inkluderet?"
Disse spørgsmål er mere praktisk anvendelige og kan besvares gennem Behandlingen. Og det er således de fleste opgaveformuleringer laves om til problemformuleringer; identificer spørgsmålene der skal besvares og formuler dem så de kan besvares.

6.2 Opgaven selv
Der er ikke som sådan grund til at gå i dybden med opgaven. Man vil bemærke at forfatteren belyser sine delspørgsmål fra forskellige sider, for at belyse dem fyldestgørende. Hun havde styr på sit stof, så hun kunne bruge sin begrænsede plads til en dybdegående behandling og diskussion af de vigtigste aspekter af emnet, og dette giver en mere elegant præsentation, såvel som demonstrerer at hun mestrer sit stof. Hun præsenterer også en fin analyse af de vedlagte tekster som en del af Behandlingen af sine delspørgsmål, og tager en kildekritisk stilling til dem som man jo skal som historiker.
Dermed kommer hun rundt om hele emnet, den eneste svaghed er, at hun ikke helt kan se sammenhængen i de udleverede spørgsmål. Dette gør Behandlingen af underspørgsmålene lidt usammenhængende, men hele opgaven fører dog fint frem til konklusionen, hvor spørgsmålene fra problemformuleringen besvares.

6.3 Konklusionen, Opsummering & Afslutning
I konklusionen opsummerer hun kort og besvarer spørgsmålene før hun kommer med et kort resume på engelsk. Perspektiveringen er begrænset til at trække tråde til i dag, men der er faktisk heller ikke så meget andet at perspektivere til uden, at det bliver søgt.

6.4 Litteraturliste
Siger lidt sig selv, sådan gør man det. Bemærk dog, at man altis skal tage Wikipedia artikler med et ekstra gran salt, men at de under anvendelse af fornuftiug kildekritik er valide kilder.



7.0 Konklusionen, Opsummering & Afslutning
Da dette er en vejledning mere end en undersøgelse må man nøjes med en opsummering.
Det vigtige når man skal skrive en opgave er at få styr på stoffet og formulere en god problemformuleringen med spørgsmål til besvarelse. Når man har gjort dette undersøges disse spørgsmål gennem Behandling (uanset hvilken model man vælger) frem til Konklusionen hvor man specifikt svarer på dem. Derefter præsenteres den litteratur man har anvendt, så læreren/censor kan kigge én i kortene.



8.0 Litteraturliste
-Rienecker, Lotte, & Jørgensen, Peter Stray: "Den gode opgave", 2. reviderede udgave, Kbh 2000.
-http://skrivopgave.emu.dk/
-http://www.ha-ka.dk/kf/Berettermodel.htm




9.0 Afsluttende Bemærkninger- Vigtigt!
*Jeg håber denne blog har hjulpet til at opnå dybere forståelse af hvordan man skriver en opgave. Men, ikke alle lærere henholder sig til samme model. Så før du går i gang; kontroller med din lærer at det er ok at følge denne model.

*Fodnoter.
Alle påstande skal underbygges ved analyse hvis du selv kommer med dem, eller med kilde, hvis en anden har fremsat dem. I sidstnævnte tilfælde er der en mængde forskellige modeller for fodnoter. Spørg din lærer, hvilken model han/hun foretrækker. Den jeg bruger kan ses både i SSO-eksemplet og i mit speciale og inkluderer fodnoter- ikke slutnoter (det er lettere at kigge i bunden af en side end at bladre); her bruges Efternavn, Fornavnsforbogstav, Årstal, Sidenr. Sidenr efterfulgt af f betyder denne og næste side, ff betyder denne og følgende sider. Citater skal altid stå i anførselstegn og det er ofte en god idé at bruge kursivskrift.

*Stavning og grammatik.
Hvis du ikke er en ørn til stavning og/eller grammatik, så få en ven, familiemedlem eller en professionel til at korrekturlæse din opgave. Det sænker det generelle indtryk, hvis den er fuld af fejl, og det er svært som forsker, at tage en forfatter seriøst, der ikke kan noget så basalt. Selv har jeg problemer med kommasætning, og jeg får altid det mere seriøse arbejde jeg laver kontrolleret af venner af samme grund.

*Sætningers længde og opbygning.
Ligeledes gør lange og komplicerede sætninger spækket med fremmedord det meget sværere, at forstå meningen. Ligeledes efterlader men et indtryk af at man prøver at virke mere vidende eller er ekstremt akademisk-indspist, ved at anvende disse. Man formidler derfor sit stof dårligere og efterlader et indtryk af at man enten er en akademisk bedrevidende snob, gøre sig bedre end man er, eller endog prøver at dække over uvidenhed ved anvendelse af disse virkemidler.
Lad være!
En god tommelfingerregel er ikke at overskride 30 ord per sætning, og ikke bruge et fremmedord med mindre der er en god grund til det; Og den eneste gode grund er, at der ikke findes et udbredt ord, der dækker.

Kontakt: palle.rasmussen@[fjern-dette]gmail.com