On the possibility of a ”Bagration 2” from Belarussia
this year.
On the 20th of December, the retired Brigadier; Michael Hesselholt Clemmensen, wrote that we should be prepared for a an attempt of a repeat of Bagration in a few months, when Russia has trained and equipped
its Mobiks and conscripts. As usually, he does what any good officer would do
and outlines the worst, but I do not see it as a worst-case scenario. I estimate that, even if Russia carries out its maximum effort as he
states is required; it cannot carry such an offensive off, and it will drown in blood; which will be good. I have warned back
in spring that the Russians would learn, but there is limits, and the learning
process has been very costly.
I shall outline below why, but here is his worst case scenario:
-
Russia will go all-out, making the maximum effort it
can within the limits of its military culture (in which I would say he has
great knowledge).
-
By death or purge, the most incompetent Russian
officers has been removed, and only the competent ones are left.
-
Russia can scrounge up enough usable equipment to equip
2- 3 armies (120000 soldiers) with uniforms, body armour, helmets, weapons,
heavy weapons, artillery, tanks, Anti-Air, transport and logistics, tanks and AFVs,
field hospitals, communications equipment, etc. etc.
-
They can thus raise those armies, who will be
efficiently commanded, and concentrate them for an offensive towards Kyiv and
one against Lutsk- Lviv in January as the ground is frozen. Employing the
traditional heavy firepower and good intelligence of Russian military tradition
for a breakthrough.
-
Artillery, logistics hubs and HQs will be located in
Belorussia to tempt the Ukrainians to shell them and draw Belorussia into the
war.
Now, here is why I disagree. My first reason is that
the staggering success of Bagration rested on the German reserves being lured
away by Maskirovka, while the Red Army secretly concentrated its forces across
from AGC. During the spring and summer of 1943, the majority of the fighting
had been in Ukraine, and the Soviet winter offensives of 1943- ’44 had broken
through the German defence lines and liberated most of the country; in the
northern parts of Ukraine, the Red Army was very close to the 1939 “Molotov-Ribbentrop”
border and poised to break into Poland. The Germans were thus conditioned to
expect another attack in Ukraine, and had concentrated most of the armour that
was not in France, as well as Luftwaffe; in Western and Northwestern Ukraine. Hence,
it was a much easier breakthrough than any before against the Wehrmacht. It is
highly unlikely that such strategic surprise can be achieved against a Ukraine
that is being fed a steady stream of intel from NATO, as well as- I suspect-
from Belorussian opposition, and their own surveillance. Hell, even commercial
satellites currently provide up to date and detailed images of developments at
the front.
Consequently, in my estimation, there is no chance of
surprising the Ukrainians. Quite the contrary, I suspect attacking Russians
would receive some nasty surprises, but more on that later. First, let us delve
into my other reasons for concluding that there will be no successful “Bagration
2”:
Death have eliminated a lot of Russian officers, true.
But only the incompetent ones? That is less certain. With a total of 1586 KIA
Russian officers,[1]
the potential leaders of these Russian units have been thinned out
significantly. And with the heavy reliance in the Russian armed forces on
top-down command from officers, and lack of initiative from subordinates, these
are crippling losses. Especially with untrained and unproven soldiers, who will
usually be distinguished by gathering together for a feeling of safety, and
being herded by officers (as we have seen in countless videos from this war). A
breakthrough with combined arms units is a complex matter that takes
coordination, and thus highly skilled commanders at all levels. Russia simply
does not have that. Further, though they can probably find 100000+ rusty AKs
(or produce new ones) and even machine guns. When it comes to heavier and more
advanced equipment as well as body armour and even winter uniforms, it seems
doubtful to me that this would be available. From what we have seen, most
vehicles in Russian storage stops working after a while from deterioration
and/or theft, and their actual numbers are much lower than the on-paper
strength.[2] The
same goes for their logistics. We have already seen that Russian logistics are
abysmal- even when not under HIMARS fire. How will these 100000 Mobiks be
supplied? They have to eat, drink, fight, and be MedEvaced when wounded. Where
will all these supplies come from? How will they be transported to the presumably
advancing and fighting troops at the front across roads infested with Ukrainian
partisans and SOF? But again, more on that later. Suffice it to say that we saw
Russia lacking trucks and other supply vehicles like the KAMAZ TYPHOON in
spring and summer already, and with the losses and dwindling production, the
situation has not likely become better. Bagration was running on supplies
carried in American Studebakers and Chevrolets, while JEEPs carried the
soldiers and officers, Corned Beef fed them, they talked on American radios,
etc., in this war American Lend Lease, weapons, technology and support is with
the other side, and it tells. Further, while partisan rail sabotage seriously
hindered German deployment of reserves and supplies in Bagration; the
Belorussian rail workers have been shown to be firmly on Ukraine’s side- at
least enough of them to delay supplies.
American-made
Studebaker and Chevrolet trucks at a Red Army depot in Mozhaysk, west of
Moscow, 1944
As for firepower; Russia undoubtedly still has it,
Bakhmut shows us that it the case. However, the shelling in Bakhmut is not
nearly as bad as that of the Sieverodonietsk area in summer, before the HIMARS
arrived to wreak havoc with Russian supplies. And it is not as if Russia’s
artillery is getting newer as they fire thousands of imprecise shells.[3] As
the tubes are wearing out, fire gets more imprecise, and more shells are
required to eliminate each target. Shells that seem to be increasingly running
out, evidenced in the Russian resupply from North Korea and Belorussia. As that
problem increases, Russian commanders will be faced increasingly to choose
between the missions that get artillery support, or use the dwindling stuck of
their precision missiles, which are admittedly quite advanced, but which also
are limited in numbers, and very expensive. I would tend to think that the concentration
of fire normal for Russian forces, will be increasingly hard to achieve. A
breakthrough is thus less likely.
Lastly, I am doubtful that even a Ukrainian fire
mission on an HQ in Belorussia would result in a DoW. “Luka” is no fool, and
from what information I have on his armed forces, they make the Russians look
like US Marines in training and equipment standards. Three Ukrainian Babuschkas
with broomsticks could drive them off. Further, many of them do not regard
Ukrainians as enemies, but as brothers, and it is likely that some would refuse
or turn, and the country would erupt in protests again as soon as a significant
potion of the armed forces were away from the cities- especially in case of a
war with Ukraine, who the Belorussian opposition definitely regards as a
friendly country.
That was the analysis on why their own incompetence is
stopping Russia from making a “Bagration 2”. However, one has to always reckon
with the enemy, and it is not as if Ukraine is not aware that Russia might
attack from Belorussia again. They know this, and they have prepared for it.
They have five Defence Brigades and two Mechanised Battalions, plus various
support units deployed. Plus likely many small Home Guard units armed with copious
amounts of LAWs, etc. Plus with timely warning various reserves can be deployed
there as a QRF, as can the redoubtable HIMARS and self-propelled guns to wreck
troop concentrations as soon as they cross the border, in the manner we have
seen all Russian troop concentrations be wrecked over the last few months. The M30A1
warheads can really wreak havoc with infantry and light vehicles, while the GIMLETs
have already proven themselves against armoured targets.
As can be seen below, Tungsten does not agree with
Russian vehicles.
If I were the Ukrainians, I would set up a forward defence
line, only lightly defended, then have strongpoints of increasing strength,
minefields and obstacles, to channel a Russian offensive into kill zones with
predesignated fires from artillery, AT and tanks as they progress 10+ km from
the border and stay-behind units hit the soft supply lines as we saw in
February- March. Ukraine has had enough time to prepare such nasty surprises
for the Russians, and I predict any such offensive will drown in blood. I could
hope they would try, for the more Russians die, the sooner the war will end.
The scenario I find more likely is a combination of a
continued assault on Bakhmut and from Donetsk City, a diversionary attack from
the north towards Kyiv, and a main push against Kharkiv. Actually… I am not
sure how likely that is, I will have to ponder on the likely Russian actions a
bit. The problem is that they do not elicit much rationality to someone
schooled in The German Way of War and it's copied by NATO version. This can to some
extent be due to corrupt officers not giving the dictator the whole picture,
Prigozhin “The Offended” and Kadyrov running their own war with internal
political aims rather than operational military ones, or a different military culture.
I do know the USSR/Russian mindset and military culture somewhat (I know the
WW2 one quite well), but the other factors make the water murky.
I also do not think the much-waunted Ukrainian offensive towards Melitopol will materialise yet. There is too much talk of it, and usually when Ukraine talks up an offensive that much (Denyz talks of itevery day); they intend to attack elsewhere. Likely Towards Luhansk.
In any case, I conclude that no “Bagration 2” can be
carried off, and if it is attempted, it will defeat itself by incompetence and
lack of equipment, and be ripped to shreds by well-prepared Ukrainian ambushes
and defences. Even a smaller version launched on Kyiv has little chance of
success. Just like the first one.
I state, as I did from the 24th of February; Russia cannot win, and
the faster some of Putolini’s henchmen understands that and remove him, the
better. But he has spent 20 years removing any potential threats, so it will be
a long and bloody while yet, and our best road to victory is to stop
procrastinating and give the Ukrainians the weapon systems they ask for (*Cough
Scholtz and ‘cough- cough Macron). The only road to victory goes across
heaps of Russian bodies, and the faster they pile up, the faster the suffering
will end.
